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ESSAY
US BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE POST-
UNCED ENVIRONMENT
FRANKLYN P. SALIMBENE*
If one image has captured the imagination of scientists, politicians,
and business leaders over the last several years, it is the image of the
world as a global village. It is "global" because people are more aware
than ever of the reach and effect of their activities on the whole planet,
and it is a "village" because directing those activities to life-sustaining
ends requires the cooperation of every nation working and pulling to-
gether as members of the same community.
Nowhere did this image of the global village loom larger than at
last summer's United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro. The clarion call for the confer-
ence came in a document entitled Agenda 21.1 Characterizing human-
ity as standing "at a defining moment in history,"2 the document noted
that the continued, long-term prosperity and well-being of each country
could only be achieved "in a global partnership for sustainable develop-
ment" joined in by all countries. The means of achieving that sustaina-
ble development was for the nations of the global village to take "a
balanced and integrated approach to environment and development
questions." 3
To encourage this global integration, the participants at Rio pro-
posed a series of statements and conventions for adoption by the na-
tions of the world. In addition to Agenda 21, these statements and con-
ventions included the Rio Declaration, the Statement of Principles on
Forests, the Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Bi-
ological Diversity. The aim of each document is fundamentally the
same, the achievement of "a more efficient and equitable world
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow at the Center for Bus-
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1. U.N. CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, DRAFT AGENDA 21,
1.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/4 (Part 1), U.N. Sales No. E. 92.1.16 (1992).
2. id.
3. Id. 1.2.
(31)
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economy."'
On a theoretical level, one would be hard-pressed to argue with
the basic premise of UNCED. Yet, as the conference approached,
there was considerable concern that the industrialized, developed coun-
tries would reject the offer of this partnership for sustainable develop-
ment with the less developed countries (LDC). In fact, there was good
reason for concern. Several weeks before the start of UNCED, the
Bush administration stated that in its view, the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity was "fundamentally flawed."6 Citing unsatisfactory lan-
guage on property rights, development funding, and biotechnology
transfer, the Department of State announced that the United States
would not sign the treaty. Following this decision, press reports indi-
cated that Japan and many European nations would follow the lead of
the United States in rejecting the treaty.6 While these reports ulti-
mately proved to be incorrect, the United States remained firmly
opposed.
This U.S. opposition was grounded in the fear that the biodiversity
treaty simply did not provide adequate protection for the intellectual
property rights of those who would invest in the technology needed to
promote biodiversity. In fact, the Department of State noted that, in its
view, the convention focused on intellectual property rights "as a con-
straint to the transfer of technology rather than as a prerequisite."7
Without protection, the United States argued that owners of technol-
ogy would be deprived of their rights to property and would refuse to
share new biotechnology.8 Such an unfortunate development would en-
danger the very objectives which the treaty sought to accomplish.
In view of the unyielding position of the United States at the Rio
conference, the U.S. business community might conclude that the over-
all results of UNCED are antithetical to its interests. In this author's
view, such a conclusion would be unfounded and unprofitable. There
was, after all, much at the conference that was encouraging. The
United States did sign the climate convention9 and it did join in UN-
CED's acceptance of the idea that environmental protection is compati-
4. Id. 72. 1.
5. Convention on Biological Diversity, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 423 (1992).
6. Keith Schneider, U.S. Will Oppose Species Treaty That Would Promote Pres-
ervation, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 1992, at Al, A4.
7. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 5.
8. Fact Sheet: US Environmental Accomplishments in Support of UNCED, 3
U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. SUPP. 9, 11 (July 1992, Supp. 4).
9. Id. at 2.
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ble with economic development.10 Further, the protection of property
rights which so motivated the United States in its opposition to the
biodiversity agreement may still be achieved despite the language of
the treaty. There are several grounds to support this conclusion. First,
however, it is important to understand the historical context of the de-
bate regarding property which has been ongoing between the developed
countries and the LDC.
Two Perspectives on Development
Amidst the poverty of the developing world, the LDC have gener-
ally viewed the accumulation of property, and thus economic growth,
as being dependent upon preferential treatment. The LDC seek such
preferential treatment from the developed countries, which have the
capital and the technology to transform their poverty into wealth. They
realize that the role of property in economic growth is crucial and that
the industrialized nations as the owners of that property have to share
it. Thus, the developing countries have sought preferences in the form
of trade concessions in bilateral commercial treaties; in the formation
of international codes of conduct governing not only nations, but also
private sector transnational activities in the developing world; and in
multilateral trade negotiations like those under the GATT. 1 In the
early 1970s, the United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order energized this movement towards
preferences. 12 In it, the General Assembly gave as one of the founding
principles of the new order, "preferential and non-reciprocal treatment
for developing countries."1 3 The declaration further affirmed the right
of a nation to full, permanent sovereignty over all economic endeavors
within its borders including the right to nationalize foreign activities
10. E.U. Curtis Bohlen, Report to Congress on Rio Conference, Statement before
Subcommittee on Oceanography, Great Lakes, and Outer Continental Shelf of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 21, 1992), in 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
Supp. 31, 32 (July 1992, Supp. 4).
11. Regarding references to preferences for developing countries in international
codes of conduct, see Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations, Economic and Social Council, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7(d), 26, 29, and
36, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). For a discussion of the issue of preferential treat-
ment for developing countries as it relates to GATT negotiations on trade in services,
see New Issues in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Centre on
Transnational Corporations, at 14, 38, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/19 (1990).
12. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm., 6th Spec. Sess.,
Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715
(1974).
13. 13 I.L.M. 718(n) (1974).
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and to transfer title of foreign-owned property to its nationals.1 ' Specif-
ically addressing the activities of transnational businesses, the declara-
tion asserted the right of a nation to regulate and supervise those busi-
nesses by taking measures based upon its own national economic policy
objectives.15 These assertions of "host nation" sovereignty and prefer-
ences have been echoed in discussions at the United Nations over the
last two decades in conferences relating to transnational corporate ac-
tivities, technology transfer, and restrictive business practices. 6
The developed countries, for their part, while gradually coming to
accept the idea of preferences, have been careful to assure that foreign
direct investment by their nationals in developing countries be pro-
tected by an international set of rules which would guarantee a mini-
mum standard of treatment regardless of host state policy objectives. 7
This minimum standard would measure "the legitimacy of the conduct
of host States in their treatment of transnational corporations."' 8 In
effect, it is the view of developed countries that international rules
aimed at safeguarding the property interests of the industrialized na-
tions will temper state sovereignty. Because of their insistence on a
minimum, internationally-accepted standard for the protection of for-
eign-owned property, the United States, the United Kingdom, and sev-
eral other industrialized nations in 1974 not only issued official reserva-
.tions to the adoption of the UN declaration on the new economic
order,' 9 but also voted against passage of a companion document, The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.0
From this position, the United States and other developed coun-
tries have argued that the protection of property in transnational busi-
ness activities is essential if LDC development is to take place. The
14. Id. at 717(e).
15. Id. at 717(d).
16. E.g., Report of the Second United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects
of the Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Re-
strictive Business Practices, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 83-90,
U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF. 3/9 (1991); CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
at 9-10, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.15 (1986) [herein-
after CODE OF CONDUCT].
17. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 16.
18. PATRICK ROBINSON, THE QUESTION OF A REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS 2, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/1, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.5 (1986).
19. See 13 I.L.M. at 744, 762 (1974).
20. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX),
U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 29th Sess., Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281
(XXIX) (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M 251 (1975).
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secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) has even come to share this view. In a report issued
on the status of negotiations relevant to the Draft International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,2 1 the secretariat noted that
given the importance attached by suppliers to the protection re-
gimes of potential recipient countries, stronger protection could
lead to greater willingness to transfer technology, particularly
new technologies. There is growing evidence that the existence
of a 'protection gap' among countries might lead to delays in
technology transfer, with potential technology suppliers insist-
ing upon adequate protection in the recipient countries before
proceeding with the relevant investment or technology
transfer.22
Such protection would have the effect of encouraging foreign direct in-
vestment by transnational businesses. The result would be more invest-
ment opportunities for technology suppliers and more development op-
portunities for developing countries.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Primarily because of this long-term position regarding property
rights, the United States decided not to sign the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity. While several offending clauses were referred to in the
U.S. Declaration opposing the treaty, the U.S. representative reiterated
the Bush administration position that "[a]s a matter of substance, we
find particularly unsatisfactory the text's treatment of intellectual prop-
erty rights ...technology transfer and biotechnology."2 3 The text of
the biodiversity treaty relating to these issues is Article 16. In sum,
Article 16 requires of each contracting party that it:
(1) undertake to provide and/or facilitate access for and trans-
fer to other countries of technologies that are relevant to
conservation;
21. The Relevance of Recent Developments in the Area of Technology to the Ne-
gotiations on the Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, at 38, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/55.
(1990) [Hereinafter Recent Developments].
22. Id.
23. United States: Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme for the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992).
1993]
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(2) take legally binding steps to provide to developing countries
which supply genetic resources access to and transfer of tech-
nology "including technology protected by patents and other in-
tellectual property rights"; and
(3) take legally bindings steps "with the aim that the private
sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of
technology ... for the benefit of both governmental institutions
and the private sector in developing countries." '24
While it was expected that other developed countries would oppose
the treaty on similar grounds, they did not. Even the United Kingdom,
a staunch proponent of property rights, ultimately agreed to sign the
treaty. Fiona McConnell, head of the British delegation at Rio, charac-
terized the possibilities for technology transfer under the biodiversity
treaty as an "exciting breakthrough." 2 5 She added, "[it means that
when developing countries contribute something they will get a share in
the benefits."2 6 The "something" given to investors in exchange for
technology transfer was access to genetic materials. In the British view,
the quid pro quo was worth it.
Unmoved by the British argument and the otherwise universal op-
position to the U.S. position, Michael Young, the alternate head of the
-U.S. delegation at UNCED, provided a press briefing in which he ar-
gued that the adoption of the treaty would lead to a high level of inter-
national regulation of the biotechnology industry. The result would be
a disincentive for companies to engage in the kind of work that would
produce the very technologies that the world needed and that UNCED
was trying to encourage." At a subsequent press briefing, William
Reilly, head of the delegation, put the point more bluntly. Asked if the
United States government would require that American industry share
its intellectual property, Reilly responded, "[w]e will not under any cir-
cumstances require that our industry share its patents or make availa-
ble its technology on concessional terms. That is what we considered
objectionable in the treaty .
24. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: The Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, May 22, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
25. Jane Perlez, 98 Nations Adopt Biological Treaty; U.S. May Not Sign, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 1992, at Al, A5.
26. Id.
27. U.S. Delegation Press Briefings (June 8, 1992), in 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
Supp. 22, (July 1992, Supp. 4).
28. U.S. Delegation Press Briefings (June 12, 1992), in 3 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
Supp. 22, 27 (July 1992, Supp. 4).
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The Meaning for U.S. Business
How should U.S. business leaders view the discussion at the Rio
conference? In particular, what effect should the U.S. position regard-
ing the biodiversity treaty have on international business decisions
made by U.S. businesses involved in technology transfer? The simple
answer is that while raising a caution for business leaders, the results of
UNCED should not discourage robust U.S. participation in the devel-
opment and transfer of technology. There are four important considera-
tions which provide support for this answer.
First, research in and development and transfer of sound technolo-
gies offer enormous business opportunities for those companies willing
to make the investment. Transfer of that technology from the industri-
alized developer to the foreign user amounts to the exportation of
knowledge.29 As an intangible asset, once developed and utilized,
knowledge in the form of technology can greatly increase the wealth of
the owner.8 0 In its study of recent developments in the area of technol-
ogy, the UNCTAD secretariat has found evidence that royalties on
new technology licenses have increased by over ten percent in the phar-
maceutical and biotechnology fields since 1980.31 In 1992, one com-
mentator indicated that royalties can be as high as twenty percent.3 2
Much of this wealth potential can be realized through the development
and transfer of technologies, which both protect the diversity of the
world's forests and exploit that diversity in the achievement of sustain-
able development. For example, the Brazilian copaiba tree, which pro-
duces liquid hydrocarbons, and a newly-discovered Mexican corn plant,
which grows as a perennial, are just two biological discoveries that have
the potential, with the proper technology, of promoting biodiversity, as-
sisting in the LDC's development, and providing economic gain for
those countries that develop and transfer the technology.33 Other types
29. For a discussion of the opportunities in technology transfer in non-
chlorofluorocarbon development, see David R. Chittick, The Transfer of Non-
Chlorofluorocarbon Technologies: A Case-Study in Industry Cooperation, in ENVI-
RONMENTALLY SOUND TECHNOLOGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 194, 195, U.N.
Doc. ST/STD/ATAS/7, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.6 (1992) [hereinafter SOUND
TECHNOLOGY].
30. See generally Juan R. Zarco, Legal and Financial Techniques for Technology
Transfer to Developing Countries, in SOUND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 29, at 181 (ex-
plaining that technology transfers can be financed creatively to minimize costs and
liabilities).
31. Recent Developments, supra note 21, at 16.
32. Zarco, supra note 30, at 182.
33. Thomas J. Goreau, Technological Options to Minimize the Loss of Biological
19931
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of environmentally sound technologies need to be developed and uti-
lized in many areas including transportation, refrigeration, and agricul-
ture. In the field of energy, the requirements of the LDC will increase
greatly as they struggle to establish their own industrial base and
thereby their own development. In view of this, some responsible com-
mentators believe that the United States should give a high priority to
the transfer of environmental technologies that increase energy effi-
ciency and minimize the net release of greenhouse gases.34
Second, there is the moral dimension. Much of the emphasis in
every United Nations effort regarding development over the last twenty
years has been on the need to improve the quality of life for all citizens
of the world, and especially for those in the developing countries. The
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order (1974) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(1974) both take their cue from Article 25 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (1948) which affirms that "[e]veryone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services . . . ."" This lesson is surely not lost
on a country that sends its armed forces half-way around the world in
order to feed the starving masses in Somalia. Technology has a trans-
forming effect; it has improved the basic human condition in those na-
tions that could afford it. The link between technology and economic
development is clear.3 In this linkage, business entities have a social
responsibility. The moral dimension impels those businesses that own
life-sustaining technology to share it for the betterment of the human
condition. The responsibility of U.S. corporate entities, for example, is
understood to encompass not only the obligation to return a profit to
shareholders, but also the duties owed to consumers, employees, and
the community within which the business operates.3 7 As businesses ex-
pand their operations into the international community, it follows that
Diversity, in SOUND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 29, at 67-68.
34. E.g., Mark S. Kasman, Economic and Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Envi-
ronmentally Sound Technologies to Developing Countries, in SOUND TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 29, at 162, 169.
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 25 (1948).
36. See, e.g., Zarco, supra note 30; David P. Hanson, The Ethics of Development
and the Dilemmas of Global Environmentalism, in BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT: THE PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE 185-194 (Michael Hoffman et al. eds., 1990).
37. See, e.g., A. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: To-
ward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, BUSINESS HORIZONS,
July/August 1991, at 39-48; P. Murphy, Creating Ethical Corporate Structures, 30
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 81 (1989).
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they likewise expand the orbit of their social responsibility. Businesses
that operate within the global village have a responsibility to it.
A third consideration which should encourage U.S. business enter-
prises to engage in technology development and transfer is an apparent
softening in the attitude of developing countries. Their hardline stance
of the 1970s encouraged by the declaration of the "new economic or-
der" has given way to the realization that behavior which threatens
foreign-owned investment is self-defeating. Foreign direct investment
"has the potential to bring substantial benefits to host economies, in
terms of capital inflows, transfer of technology and skills, employment,
purchasing power and linkages to the world economy." 3 Despite this
promise, the 1980s turned out to be a period of economic stagnation
and decline for many LDC. Speaking as the representative of the de-
veloping countries at a United Nations development conference in
1990, India characterized the 1980s as a "lost decade of develop-
ment." 9 The irony was that while the LDC experienced a lost decade,
the annual flows of foreign direct investment by transnational corpora-
tions grew by more than 300 percent between 1984 and 1989 alone, to
the level of $200 billion.4 Aware of the lost opportunity, LDC behavior
has changed. One result has been a dramatic decrease in the number of
expropriations of foreign-owned property by the LDC. At the height of
activity in the 1970s, as many as eighty-three incidents of expropriation
occurred in one year-1975. By the end of the 1980s, that number fell
to an average of less than three per year. "1 Another result has been the
wholesale revision by many developing countries of their foreign direct
investment laws. These revisions have liberalized those laws to attract
transnational corporate activity. Specifically, many less developed coun-
tries today are allowing foreign investors tax concessions, free repatria-
tion of profits to their home countries, exemptions from local fees, dis-
counts on the cost of real estate leases, accelerated rates of
depreciation, and more."2
38. David Gold, The Determinants for FDI and Their Implications for Host De-
veloping Countries, 31 CTC REP. 21, 21 (1991).
39. Report of the Second United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of
the Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restric-
tive Business Practices, supra note 16, 1 83.
40. Gold, supra note 38, at 21.
41. John Kline, A New Environment for the Code, 29 CTC REP. 2, 2 (1990).
42. See generally A.B.M.M. Islam and Neema Mujmudar, Trends and Issues in
FDI Laws in Least Developed Countries, 30 CTC REP. 7 (1990) (demonstrating that
there is a trend towards liberalization in the recent legislation of many LDC regarding
foreign direct investment); Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 6, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE
19931
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Fourth, there are several legal mechanisms available to U.S. busi-
nesses interested in engaging in international technology transfer that
offer substantial protection for property rights. These legal mechanisms
include licensing, outright sale, and joint venture agreements.4 Licens-
ing grants permission to use a technology in exchange for a fee or roy-
alty payment. The level of risk to the owner in granting the license is
reflected in the level of the payment. Outright sales of technology
transfer ownership of that technology to the purchaser. The sale price
would, at a minimum, reflect the cost of the investment made by the
seller and the unique nature of the technology. Joint ventures between
the developer of the technology and the foreign purchaser provide an-
other opportunity for technology transfer and profit. This approach en-
courages the protection of the technology involved by granting a vested
interest in it to the developing country.
These considerations ought to encourage U.S. businesses to engage
in the kind of technology transfer envisaged in the biodiversity treaty.
There are always risks when property is invested in business activities,
let alone international business activities. The U.S. delegation at the
Rio conference was correct to underline them. The language in Article
16 of the biodiversity treaty does allow governments the right to act to
facilitate technology transfer in the interests of their own economic de-
velopment, but it also recognizes the need for adequate and effective
intellectual property protection. Perhaps that protection could have
been more forcefully underscored in the treaty. Perhaps the Clinton
Administration, at Vice President Gore's urging, will decide to sign the
treaty regardless of the fears voiced by the Bush administration." The
ultimate test for U.S. business interests, however, is whether in the
search for profits, those interests will respond to the call for sustainable
development in a manner that is creative and responsible, as well as
profitable. The reality of life in the global village requires nothing less.
TOT/52 (1988) (discussing the changing environment of international transfer of
technology).
43. See generally Zarco, supra note 30, at 182-184; Kasman, supra note 34, at
168 (arguing that intellectual property rights protection is no stumbling block in trans-
ferring environmentally sound technologies).
44. On April 21, 1993, President Clinton announced that the United States would
become a signatory of the Biodiversity Treaty. See N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1993, at Al.
